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This paper discusses thirteenth and fourteenth-century Byzantine perceptions
of civil wars, which were a common feature in the late Byzantine period. It investi-
gates how the most important authors of the period understood and defined the idea
of civil war. It explores the Byzantine understanding of the differences between mil-
itary conflicts which were fought between subjects and employees of the emperor
and wars the empire fought against its external enemies. In addition, it examines the
views the imperial authorities and the authors of the period express about wars
against enemies with whom the later Byzantines shared a common cultural, ethnic
and religious background.
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This article will examine thirteenth and fourteenth-century Byzantine con-
cepts of armed conflicts which can be defined as civil wars (emfulioi polemoi).
Wars between aristocratic clans and between members of the inner imperial fam-
ily were a common feature in the later Byzantine period. However, not many
scholars have attempted to provide a definition of the idea of civil war in late By-
zantium. In his discussion of Byzantine attitudes towards warfare, W. Treadgold
suggested ‘as a working definition of Byzantine civil war an armed conflict in
which a significant number of Byzantine soldiers fought on both sides with a sig-
nificant number of casualties.’1 This is a reasonable definition and, possibly, ap-
plicable to most internal conflicts in Byzantium before 1204. However, it cannot
describe accurately the complexities of the internal armed conflicts in late Byzan-
tium. The presence of a significant number of Byzantine soldiers fighting on both
sides was not necessary, since the Byzantine government had employed a large
1 W. Treadgold, Byzantium. The Reluctant Warrior, edd. N. Christie-M. Yazigi, Noble Ideals
and Bloody Realities Warfare in the Middle Ages, Leiden 2006, 224.
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Recueil des travaux de l’Institut d’etudes byzantines XßIX, 2012number of mercenary soldiers from outside the empire. Many of these mercenar-
ies, such as the Catalan Grand Company, which was recruited by Andronikos II
(1282–1328) in 1302, were large and self-interested bodies of soldiers that had
their own internal organization. In 1305, disputes over payment and mutual mis-
trust resulted in an armed conflict between the Byzantine state and the Catalan
Grand Company. Was this conflict a civil war, given that the Catalans were em-
ployees of the Byzantine emperor? In addition, some of the enemies of the
so-called empire of Nicaea and of the early Palaiologan rulers shared a common
ethnic, cultural and religious identity with them. Were the wars against them
viewed as civil wars?
The complexities of the concept of civil war in later Byzantium are reflected
in the accounts of the historians of the period. The most important source for the
history of the so-called empire of Nicaea, George Akropolites, does not use the
term civil war (emfulioj polemoj). Nonetheless, he makes the distinction be-
tween the war against an external enemy and the war against internal enemies. He
calls the conspiracy of a group of Nicaean aristocrats against John III Vatatzes
(1221–1254), which took place in 1224/1225, ‘internal war’ as opposed to the
‘external war’( esw polemoj and exw polemoj) against the Latin empire of Con-
stantinople. As he writes, the emperor learnt about the conspiracy while he was re-
siding in Lampsakos and
he destroyed the triremes with fire so that they will not fall into the hands of the
Italians ‰The Latin Empire of ConstantinopleŠ and, judging the internal war to be of
more importance than the external one, he left from there and went to the area of
Achyraous, and there he made an investigation of the plot.2
Pachymeres makes numerous references to the idea and definition of civil war
and, unlike Akropolites, he uses the term emfulioj polemoj to refer to internal
armed conflicts. He states that upon the coronation of Michael VIII (1259–1282) the
Nicaean magnates took an oath of loyalty to him. Pachymeres believes that they did
so out of fear and because they wanted to avoid being blamed for causing civil wars,
if they opposed him.3 Furthermore, Pachymeres considers the military conflict
which was the result of the rebellion of the inhabitants of the area of Zygenoi
around Nicaea (1262) as a civil war. He writes that when Michael VIII was in-
formed about the rebellion, he was enraged and sent the whole army to fight civil
wars.4 Similarly, he considers the conflict which followed the rebellion of the gen-
eral and nephew of the emperor, Alexios Philanthropenos, in Asia Minor in 1295 as
a civil war.5 Therefore, Pachymeres defines as being civil wars, the conspiracy of
the aristocratic elite against the emperor, the response of the throne to a revolt in a
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2 Georgii Acropolitae Opera, ed. A. Heisenberg, Leipzig 1903, I, 37. For the conspiracy
against John III see R. Macrides, George Akropolites. The History, Oxford 2007, 170.
3 Georges Pachymeres. Relations historiques, ed. A. Failler, Paris 1984–2000, I, 135–137.
4 Ibid., 261.
5 Pachymeres, III,2 4 9 .rural provincial area in the early 1260s and the rebellion of a high-ranking military
commander and member of the wider imperial family in the 1290s.
Moreover, Pachymeres implies that a common ethnic, cultural and religious
identity is not the exclusive criterion for distinguishing a civil war from a war
against external enemies. In 1301, Andronikos II employed a large group of Alan
mercenaries. In 1302, they participated in the failed campaigns of the co-emperor
Michael IX (1294–1320) in Magnesia and of the megaj etaireiarchj Leo
Mouzalon in Bithynia. Shortly afterwards, the Alans announced their intention to
leave the empire. Pachymeres relates that when the Alans decided to depart,
Andronikos II sent the megaj domestikoj Alexios Raoul to get back the weapons
and horses the emperor had provided the Alans with. The Alans resisted and as
Pachymeres comments,‘ a dispute and civil battle (mach fuletikh) broke out. Al-
though the armies were of different race, they were placed under a single author-
ity, the imperial one. Therefore, this was a civil war (emfulioj polemoj).’6 In the
same context, Pachymeres describes the fighting between the Catalan Grand Com-
pany and the Byzantine government as a civil war. For instance, he argues that al-
though by the end of March of 1304 had received their salaries, the Catalans did
not campaign. Instead, they were involved in fighting civil wars. In addition, he
remarks that members of the court of the co-emperor Michael IX, who after his
failure to resist the advance of the Turcoman principalities in Asia Minor had es-
tablished his court in Adrianople, complained of the attitude of the Catalans and
requested to fight against them. Michael IX refrained them; however, he asked his
father and senior emperor, Andronikos II, not to allow the Catalans march to
Thrace because this would cause a civil war between the Byzantines and the Cata-
lan Grand Company.7
Pachymeres’ understanding of the idea of civil war emphasizes the political
and economic and not the cultural and ethnic identity of the fighting parties. The
Alans and the Catalans were not culturally connected to the Byzantines. They
were not Romans. However, since they served in the Byzantine army they had
economic bonds with the Byzantine state and were employees of the emperor.
Therefore, the wars against them were internal wars, civil wars. Pachymeres’ ac-
count of the conflict between the Byzantine state and its foreign mercenaries im-
plies that the term emfulioj polemoj (a war fought between people of the same
race/ethnicity) does not fully correspond to the nature of these conflicts. However,
the absence of an appropriate term to describe accurately the conflicts between
subjects or employees of the emperor who were of diverse cultural background led
him to use the term ‘emfulioj polemoj.’
The period 1321–1354 was characterized by large-scale civil wars. The civil
war which was fought intermittently from 1321 until 1328 between Andronikos II
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Minor and the conflict between the Company and the Byzantine State see A. Laiou, Constantinople
and the Latins. The Foreign Policy of Andronikos II, Cambridge MA 1972, 131–233.and his grandson Andronikos III (1328–1341) was a war fought between those
who possessed the largest shares of the empire’s resources under Andronikos II
and those who by Michael IX’s unexpected death in 1320 lost their hope of gain-
ing imperial favour and their priority in claiming offices and imperial grants. In
1341, the unexpected death of Andronikos III was followed by the outbreak of a
civil war between John Kantakouzenos (John VI, 1347–1354), who claimed to be
the defender of the legitimate rights of Andronikos III’ss o n , John V Palaiologos
(1341–1391) and the regency in Constantinople, which was led by the megaj doux
Alexios Apokaukos, the patriarch John Kalekas and Andronikos III’sw i d o w ,
Anna of Savoy. This civil war, w h i c he n d e di n1347 with the victory of
Kantakouzenos’ party, was a conflict among aristocratic cliques, which fought
over access to the empire’s dwindling resources through the exertion of influence
on the throne. The rival parties relied on networks based on kinship, common in-
terest and patronage.8
Kantakouzenos, who was one of the main protagonists of these civil wars, as
a result of which the empire suffered dramatic territorial losses, stresses repeatedly
that these were conflicts fought between people of the same ethnic group
(omofuloi). The enemy parties were connected by social, cultural, religious and
family bonds. It seems, though, that the term omofuloi in the Histories of
Kantakouzenos refers more to the leaders of the fighting parties and to the people
of Byzantine towns who suffered the consequences of the war that was fought be-
tween claimants of the imperial authority and less to the opposing armies, which
were largely composed of non-Byzantine mercenaries and allies. It is difficult to
ascertain whether Kantakouzenos would consider any conflict similar to that be-
tween the Byzantine state and the Alans and the Catalans as civil war, since no
such conflict took place during the period he describes in his Histories. Nonethe-
less, foreign mercenaries were an integral part of the armies that fought in the civil
wars and the Histories of Kantakouzenos show that many of them, such as those
who received from him the title of kavallarioi and played a leading role in the
ceremony of his coronation in 1341, did not lack political and social ties with the
Byzantine society.9 Therefore, they were not viewed as outsiders and different
from the native soldiers.
Moreover, Kantakouzenos repeatedly contrasts the Byzantine civil wars
which were wars fought between omofuloi with the wars against the ‘infidel,’
‘impious barbarians’ and ‘natural enemies’ of the empire implying the Turks.10 In
1322, when the forces of Andronikos III besieged and captured the town of Apros
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8 For the self portrayal of Kantakouzenos as the defender of John V’s succession rights see. F.
Dolger, Johannes VI. Kantakouzenos als dynastischer Legitimist, PARASPORA, Ettal 1961,
194–207. For a detailed analysis of the civil war of 1341–1347 see K.-P. Matshke, Fortschtritt und
Reaktion in Byzanz im 14. Jahrhundert: Konstantinopel in der Burgerkriegsperiode von 1341 bis
1354, Berlin 1971.
9 Ioannis Cantacuzeni eximperatoris historiarum libri IV, edd. L. Schopen — B. Niehbur, Bonn
1828–1832, II, 166.
10 Kantakouzenos, I, 160, II, 396, III, 57.which was under the control of forces loyal to his grandfather Andronikos II,
Kantakouzenos stated that no soldier from either side died in the battle, nor were
any of the prisoners killed, because special care was shown by the younger
Andronikos and God helped. According to Kantakouzenos, Andronikos III said,
‘we should fight against the barbarians until the end. Against the omofuloi we
should fight as much as is profitable.’11 In 1322, during the negotiations that led
to the end of the first phase of the civil war of 1321–1328, Kantakouzenos re-
marked that the victory against those of the omofuloi should be considered not as
a victory, but instead, as the most shameful defeat.12 When in 1327, the army
loyal to Andronikos III led by Theodore Synadenos defeated an army led by
Constantine Asan close to Constantinople, Andronikos III allegedly regretted that
the dead were Byzantines and feared that some of them might have been very
closely related to him. He considered that it would have been a great honour if
they had fallen fighting the barbarians.13
The accentuation of the ethnic and religious identity of the Byzantines, who
instead of fighting civil wars, should unite and fight against the impious barbari-
ans is explained by the personal motives of Kantakouzenos. It does not mean that
Kantakouzenos regretted the wars against his omofuloi. Nor does it reflect the
prevalence of an ideology which emphasized the religious, ethnic and cultural
identity of the Byzantines in the wars against the Turks. The aim of Kanta-
kouzenos was to justify his involvement in the civil wars and to exonerate himself
from the charge that he contributed to the expansion of the Turks by using them as
allies and mercenaries in the civil conflicts of the 1340sa n d1350s. Moreover, the
most important military operations led by Andronikos III and Kantakouzenos re-
lied heavily on the military aid of Turcoman principalities and it should not be for-
gotten that Kantakouzenos compiled his account in the 1360s when the Ottomans
were starting to expand in Europe at the expense of the Byzantines.14
Another fourteenth-century author who comments on the idea and nature of
civil war in Byzantium and more specifically on the armed conflicts between
members of the inner circle of the imperial family is the orator Theodore
Potamianos. He refers to the conflict between John V and his son Andronikos IV
(1376–1379) as a difference between the emperors. After the two rulers reached an
agreement Potamianos wrought in 1382, ‘we should be grateful, for the emperors fi-
nally put an end to their differences and saved us from a bleak fate.’ He attributes
the conflict to what he calls the littleness of the soul of the rulers and he is aware
of the consequences the differences between the emperors have on state affairs. In
a letter to Demetrios Kydones, he wrote,‘ the civil war between the two emperors
dragged the land of the Romans to this point of misfortune. As a result undeserv-
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14 On the dating of the Histories of Kantakouzenos see D. Nicol, The Byzantine Family of
Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus) ca. 1100–1460, Washington 1986, 100.ing people have chanced upon the greatest honours and contrary to all justice and
honours have amassed great wealth.’15
The observation that the Byzantine civil wars were fought either between
subjects and employees of the emperor, or between people of the same ethnicity
(omofuloi) raises the question of the Byzantine identity when the empire waged
wars against enemies with whom the Byzantines shared a common cultural and re-
ligious background, such as the state of Epiros and the principality of Thessaly.16
These military conflicts have been treated as civil wars by modern scholars.17 This
interpretation relies on the fact that Epiros, Thessaly and Trebizond were
‘Byzantine’ successor states to the Byzantine empire which disintegrated in 1204.
However, the rulers of these states and their subjects were not always seen as
Byzantines by late Byzantine authors. A n dw h e nt h e yw e r ev i e w e da sR o m a n s , the
wars against them were not called civil wars. For Akropolites, who had personal
reasons to dislike the Epirots, since he had been a prisoner of Michael II
Komnenos Doukas (1230–1271), the state of Epiros together with the Turks, Bul-
garians and Latins were the enemies of Nicaea.18 For Akropolites, Romans are
those who are with or on the side of the rulers of the so-called empire of Nicaea.19
Therefore, the brother and successor of the ruler of Epiros Michael I Komnenos
Doukas (1204–1215), Theodore Komnenos Doukas (1215–1230), was ‘with the
emperor of the Romans, Theodore I Lakaris (1204–1221), serving him like the
rest of the Romans.’ When in 1217 Theodore Komnenos Doukas defeated and
captured the Latin emperor of Constantinople, Peter of Courtenay ‘this was a great
help to the Romans.’20 However, when Theodore was proclaimed emperor in
Thessalonica, he and his subjects became enemies of the empire.21 Describing the
annexation of Thessalonica, by John III in 1246, Akropolites states that the city
became subject ‘to the Romans, for those who had ruled it were opposed to the
Romans.’22 In his account of a conspiracy orchestrated by Michael II Komnenos
Doukas and his uncle Theodore Komnenos Doukas, Akropolites relates that John
III considered no others to be enemies of the empire of the Romans after the con-
quests of Constantinople, if not they. These statements show that in his narrative
of Epirote affairs, Akropolites adopts the point of view of the so-called empire of
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15 Theodore Potamianos Letters, ed. G. Dennis, Byzantium and the Franks 1350–1420, Lon-
don 1982, 21, 32–33.
16 The ideological, political and ecclesiastical competition between Nicaea and Epiros over
their legitimacy as successor states to the Byzantine empire are discussed in detail by A.
Stavridou-Zafraka, Nikaia kai Hpeiroj ton 13o aiwna. Ideologikh antiparaqesh sthn
prospaqeiej na anakthsoun thn autokratoria, Thessaloniki 1991; A. Karpozelos, The Ecclesias-
tical Controversy between the Kingdom of Nicaea and the Principality of Epiros, Thessaloniki 1973.
17 Treadgold, The Reluctant Warrior, 221, 224.
18 For an analysis of the presentation of the state of Epiros in the History of Akropolites see
Macrides, The History, 94–97.
19 See Macrides, The History,9 4 .
20 Akropolites, I, 25–26.
21 Ibid., 34.
22 Ibid., 83.Nicaea according to which the Epirots were not proper Romans. They are ‘the
western race’ and ‘the inhabitants of the western parts’.23 This approach reflects
one of the consequences of the events of the period 1204–1261, which was the re-
treat of ideas concerning the unique position of the empire in the oikoumenh and
its mission to spread Christianity.24 The successor states to the Byzantine empire
knew that they were the products of the abnormalities caused by the capture of
Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204 and believed that the real Byzantine em-
pire would be restored only when the Latins were expelled from Constantinople.25
After the recovery of Constantinople in 1261, imperial propaganda revived
Komnenian models and traditional ideological claims of ecumenism which had
faded in the period 1204–1261.26 The revival of ideas of imperial ecumenism sup-
ported the claim of world supremacy and of the preservation of imperial rule over
the Christian oikoumenh, which, as the megaj logoqethj Theodore Metochites
comments, was much larger than the territories controlled by the Byzantine
state.27 This ideological framework could have permitted the development of con-
cepts which represented the wars against Christian enemies of Byzantium as civil
wars. This is indicated by an event reported by Pachymeres. He writes that in 1265
the patriarch Arsenios met Michael VIII who had returned from a failed campaign
against Epiros. In this meeting, the patriarch reminded the emperor that he had
prohibited him from campaigning against Christians, stating that there is nothing
profitable in such campaigns. Arsenios told Michael VIII that he should thank
God for saving his soul from the enemies, who were seeking it, referring to the
combined Tatar and Bulgarian attack in Thrace in 1264, which put Michael VIII,
who at that time was campaigning in the west against Epiros, in a very difficult
position. Arsenios reminded the emperor that he had opposed the campaign
against Michael II Komnenos Doukas, urging him not to provoke civil wars
(emfuliouj polemouj). The patriarch also stated that Michael II Komnenos
Doukas, was a Christian like Michael VIII. The prayers of the patriarch for Mi-
chael VIII are equally prayers for the Epirots because both belong to the folk of
Christ.28 Therefore, the patriarch of Constantinople considers the military conflict
between the Byzantine empire and the state of Epiros as civil wars. The Epirots
were Christians and consequently the war against them was a civil war. Arsenios’
statement is the only instance in which the wars against Epiros are called civil
wars. The lack of similar information indicates that probably the patriarch ex-
pressed his personal views concerning the nature of the conflict between Byzan-
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26 R. Macrides, From the Komnenoi to the Palaiologoi: Imperial Models in Decline and Exile,
ed. P. Magdalino, New Constantines: The Rhythm of Imperial Renewal in Byzantium,4 th–13th Cen-
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27 Theodori Metochitae miscellanea philosophica et historica, ed. G. Muller, Leipzig 1821, 717.
28 Pachymeres, I, 313–315.tium and Epiros and the role of the patriarchate. Furthermore, the bad relations be-
tween Arsenios and Michael VIII should be seen as the main reason why the patri-
arch opposed the emperor’s wars against Epiros.29
Nevertheless, the available evidence indicates that the revival of traditional
ideas of imperial ecumenism enabled the Palaiologoi to identify the wars they
waged as wars aiming at the restoration of imperial rule over territories which they
claimed as legitimately parts of the Byzantine empire. In this ideological frame-
work the wars against the state of Epiros and the principality of Thessaly were not
called civil wars but military actions against rebels. It may be argued that the iden-
tification of the other ‘Byzantine’ political entities as rebels implies a civil con-
flict. Indeed, unlike the Laskarids, the Palaiologoi viewed the Epirots as proper
Romans. However, they were not subjects of the emperor although they ought to
be so. Therefore, by promoting the idea that the rulers of Epiros and Thessaly
were rebels, the Palaiologoi claim that they fought against enemies who resisted
their established and legitimate rule. In his autobiography, Michael VIII states that
in 1259 in the battle of Pelagonia, where the Byzantine army defeated the com-
bined forces of the Epirots, the Latin principality of Achaia and their German al-
lies, he defeated the ‘Romans who had defected long ago.’30 In the tupikon for
the monastery of the archangel Michael, Michael VIII refers to ‘t h et e r r i b l er a g i n g
against us of the renegades who are of the same Roman race as we.’31 In 1262,
John Palaiologos, Michael VIII’sb r o t h e r , campaigned against Michael II
Komnenos Doukas. According to Pachymeres, John Palaiologos justified this
campaign by stating that Michael II could no longer claim that he had the right to
occupy imperial lands, using the justification that the emperor was outside of the
patrij (Constantinople), since the emperor was restored to Constantinople.32 In
his account of the campaign of Andronikos III against the Epirots in 1339/1340,
Kantakouzenos writes that the Angeloi had not gained their authority by liberating
Epiros from barbarians. Instead, they were subjects of the Byzantine emperors and
received from them the annual administrative authority over the land. However,
they took advantage of the war between Byzantium and the armies of the Fourth
Crusade and usurped the imperial authority over Epiros. When the Latins were ex-
pelled and the Byzantine rulers unified the parts of Europe and Asia they had for-
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29 In 1265, a synod deposed the patriarch Arsenios who had excommunicated Michael VIII on
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III, 1233.
32 Pachymeres, I, 275.merly ruled, they demanded Epiros from the Angeloi. However, they were not
given it. Consequently, by campaigning against the Epirots, as Kantakouzenos
concludes, Andronikos III is claiming his paternal authority. It has been argued
that Kantakouzenos alludes to the fact that when Theodore Komnenos Doukas left
Asia Minor for Epiros about 1207 to take over after the death of his brother he was
made to swear an oath of loyalty to the rulers of Nicaea.33
It is worth noting that this imperial view of the wars against the Epirots is
confirmed by a document compiled by the patriarch John Kalekas. The patriarch
writes that when John Doukas Orsini (1325–1335) had died, t h ep e o p l eo f
Ioannina should have thought sensibly and submitted to God’se m p i r e , as they
ought to do. The Angeloi should rule Epiros as provincial governors and not as in-
dependent rulers.34 This document is an indication that the views expressed by the
patriarch Arsenios in the 1260s did not reflect the official imperial and ecclesiasti-
cal position according to which, the Epirots were Romans, however, the wars
against them were military operations against rebels who defied the authority of
the emperor in Constantinople and established their own independent political en-
tity. Moreover, the principle of fighting for the re-imposition of imperial rule was
compatible with the Byzantine ideas of the Just War as expressed in Byzantine le-
gal texts and historical accounts of earlier periods of Byzantine history and have
been analyzed by Angeliki Laiou. For instance, according to the Eisagoge, which
was promulgated by the emperors Basil I, (867–886), Leo VI (886–912) and Alex-
ander (912–913),
the purpose of the emperor is to safeguard and maintain through his virtue to the
things which exist; to acquire through vigilance the things lost; a n dt or e c o v e r
through his wisdom and through just victories the things which are absent.35
It has been shown that before 1204 there were instances which indicate that
wars against Christian peoples could be viewed as civil wars. In the early tenth
century, the patriarch Nicholas I Mystikos wrote numerous letters to the Bulgarian
ruler Symeon (893–927) presenting the conflict between Byzantium and the Bul-
garians as civil wars because both sides were Christians. For instance, he states
that Symeon’s attacks against Byzantium are violation of oaths, denial of faith and
corruption of piety. He adds that it is a great scandal that the Bulgarians and the
Byzantines, who both are inheritors of the brotherhood of Christ, are not at peace
and that earth should stop polluted with Christian blood.36 It has been argued that,
the identification of wars against Christians with civil wars is connected to the
ideological and diplomatic developments of the period and to the adoption by the
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Washington 1973, 26–74.ruling Byzantine elite of an ideology which promoted the Christianization of for-
eign peoples as a means to exert political control over political entities that could
not be easily subjugated by military means.37
Ideological and religious arguments with regard to the military conflicts
with the Bulgarians were employed after 1204. Kantakouzenos reports that when
in 1328 the Bulgarians raided Byzantine territories in Thrace, Andronikos III sent
an embassy to the Bulgarian ruler Michael [i{man (1323–1330) complaining that
he had broken their agreements. Kantakouzenos adds that the Byzantine emperor
protested that since both armies were of the same religion they should fight to-
gether against the impious, meaning the Turks. Kantakouzenos remarks that a sim-
ilar discussion took place in 1332 on the eve of the battle of Rosokastron, where
the Bulgarians under their ruler John Alexander (1331–1371) inflicted a crushing
defeat on the army of Andronikos III. When the Bulgarian emperor sent an em-
bassy asking for peace, suggesting that each side maintain whatever it possessed
at that moment, Andronikos III replied that it was not he who started that war and
added that it is not right for the Bulgarians and the Byzantines to fight against
each other, since both are Christians. Instead, they should fight united against the
impious. It is interesting that Gregoras, a supporter of Andronikos II and a critic of
Andronikos III, attributes this statement to the Bulgarian emperor.38
Kantakouzenos’ statements that the Bulgarians and the Byzantines must not
fight against each other should not lead to the conclusion that the later Byzantine
empire had developed an ideology according to which wars against co-religious
enemies were civil wars and should be avoided. By pointing out that he and
Andronikos III opposed the wars against fellow Orthodox Christians,
Kantakouzenos responds to the criticism that his policies contributed to the expan-
sion of the Turks at the expense of the Byzantines and that he relied on Turkish al-
lies and mercenaries to usurp the throne. Furthermore, when in 1323 and 1341
Kantakouzenos claims that he supported the waging of war against the Bulgarians,
he made no reference to the religious identity of the enemy. Instead, in 1341
Kantakouzenos told the Bulgarian ruler John Alexander that he would not hesitate
to send against him the army of the ruler of Ayd›n, Umur, w h oh a do f f e r e dt of i g h t
on the side of Kantakouzenos against the Bulgarians in exchange of booty.39
Demetrios Kydones, who was the mesazwn of John VI Kantakouzenos, John
V and Manuel II Palaiologos (1391–1425), is another fourteenth-century author
who commented on the religious character of the conflict between the Byzantines
and the Bulgarians. In 1366, he wrote that it would be ideal to ally with the Serbi-
ans and the Bulgarians against the Turks; however, the Byzantines should not for-
get that in the past the Serbians and the Bulgarians had attacked and seized
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38 Kantakouzenos, I, 160, 462; Nicephori Gregorae Byzantina Historia, ed. L. Schopen, Bonn
1829–1855, I,4 8 4 .
39 Kantakouzenos, I, 179–187, II, 57.Byzantine lands without any provocation, that they had shown brutality towards
the Byzantines, that they had imposed heavier taxation than the Turks, and they
had not accepted the Byzantine proposal for alliance based on mutual religion.40
Kydones made this statement in a period when the main priority of the Byzantine
state was to attract military aid from the Latin west. Therefore it was important
that people would be convinced that on the basis of past experiences the
Byzantines could not expect any aid from their co-religious neighbours.
The comments of Kantakouzenos and Kydones with regard to the common
religion of the Byzantines and the Bulgarians reflect their personal aims. It seems
that in the late Byzantine period the dominating view of the Bulgarians in general
is not one of brothers in faith, but of external enemies. For instance, Akropolites
emphasizes the ethnic identity of the Bulgarians whom he calls race and kin
(fulh, genoj) and points out their enduring hatred for the Romans.41 Theodore II
Laskaris (1255–1259), who led two expeditions against the Bulgarians, praises his
father John III, for punishing the Bulgarians for their treacherous attitude and for
reminding them of their ancient subjection to the Byzantines.42 Pachymeres, who
sees the military conflicts between the Byzantine state and its large groups of for-
eign mercenaries as civil wars, does not call the wars against Christian political
entities civil wars.
The main conclusion of this study is that the perception of civil war in thir-
teenth and fourteenth-century Byzantium was one of a military conflict inside the
Byzantine state and between subjects and employees of the emperor regardless of
the ethnic, cultural and religious identity of the combatants. Therefore, the mili-
tary conflicts with groups of soldiers of fortune who had been employed by the
imperial authorities, such as the Catalan Grand Company, could be defined as
civil wars. The late Byzantines were involved in wars against enemies with whom
they shared a common cultural and religious identity, such as the state of Epiros
and the principality of Thessaly. However, these conflicts were not seen as civil
wars. Wishing to promote their legitimacy as successors to the Byzantine empire
the Laskarids of Nicaea portrayed the Epirots as external enemies of the empire.
The Palaiologoi did not view the Epirots as external enemies. Imperial propaganda
under the Palaiologan rulers promoted the idea that the wars against other
‘Byzantine’ political entities were campaigns against rebellious subjects who re-
sisted the legitimate authority of the Byzantine emperor. The wars against them
were just wars the aim of which was their incorporation to the restored Byzantine
empire. Therefore, it was possible wars against the same enemy to be seen either
as civil wars or as wars against an external enemy or wars against rebels. This
shows that often the definition of what was a civil war and what was a war against
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40 Demetrios Kydones, Pro Subsidio Latinorum, PG 156, cols. 972–973.
41 Macrides, The History, 90; Akropolites, 108,115,152.
42 Teodoro II Duca Laskari. Encomio dell’ imperatore Giovani Duca, ed. L. Tartaglia, Naples
1990, 51.an external enemy or rebellious subjects depended more on political expedience
and circumstance and less on the cultural and ethnic identity of the opponents.
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Savas Kirijakidis
IDEJA O GRA\ANSKOM RATU U VIZANTIJI 13. i 14. VEKA
Istra`ivawe je posve}eno vizantijskim konceptima oru`anih sukoba
u 13. i 14. veku, koji mogu biti definisani kao gra|anski ratovi (emfulioi
polemoi), {to je bila uobi~ajena pojava u pozno-vizantijsko doba.
Georgije Akropolit, istori~ar tzv. Nikejskog carstva, ne upotrebqava
izraz emfulioj polemoj da bi opisao unutra{we oru`ane sukobe. Ipak, govo-
re}i o jednom aristokratskom revoltu protiv Jovana III Vataca, on pravi raz-
liku izme|u rata protiv spoqweg neprijateqa i rata protiv carevih unutra-
{wih neprijateqa. Za razliku od Akropolita, Pahimer upotrebqava izraz
emfulioj polemoj da ozna~i unutra{we vojne sukobe, kao {to je bio lokalni
revolt Zigina. Iz Pahimerovog ugla posmatrawa zajedni~ko etni~ko, religi-
ozno i kulturno zale|e nije bio jedini kriterijum za razlikovawe gra|an-
skih ratova od ratova protiv spoqa{wih neprijateqa Carstva. On komenta-
ri{e sukobe izme|u vizantijske dr`ave i katalanskih i alanskih pla}enika
kao gra|anske ratove, budu}i da su ovi pla}enici bili u slu`bi carevoj i,
stoga, wegovi podanici.
Kantakuzin prime}uje da su gra|anski ratovi predstavqali sukobe iz-
me|u qudi istog etni~kog porekla (omofuloi). On u nekoliko mahova pravi
razliku izme|u ratova koje me|usobno vode omofuloi i onih koji se vode pro-
tiv nevernih varvara i prirodnih neprijateqa Carstva. Ovakav pristup ne
podrazumeva razvitak ideolo{kog gledi{ta koje bi nagla{avalo verski i et-
ni~ki identitet Vizantinaca u ratovima protiv Turaka. On otkriva, u stva-
ri, Kantakuzinov poku{aj da sebe oslobodi optu`be da je wegova politika
dovela do ekspanzije Turaka na {tetu Vizantinaca.
Vizantinci poznog vremena bili su upleteni u ratove protiv neprija-
teqa sa kojima su delili zajedni~ki kulturni, religiozni i etni~ki identi-
tet, kao {to je bio slu~aj sa Epirom i Tesalijom. Raspolo`ivi podaci poka-
zuju da su vladari tzv. Nikejskog carstva zastupali ideju da su Epiroti spo-
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olozi su u Epirotima i Tesalcima videli Romeje. Me|utim, ratovi protiv
wih nisu bili posmatrani kao gra|anski ratovi, nego kao napori da se poko-
re nekada{wi podanici. Ozna~avawem Epirota i Tesalaca kao pobuwenika,
vizantijski vladari su svoje kampawe protiv wih opravdavali kao pravedne
ratove, ~iji je ciq bio da otpadnici budu ukqu~eni u obnovqeno Vizantij-
sko carstvo. Patrijarh Arsenije bio je jedini predstavnik vizantijske vla-
sti koji je ratove protiv Epira {ezdesetih godina 13. veka proglasio gra-
|anskim ratovima. Me|utim Arsenijevi pogledi nisu imali podr{ku nijed-
nog kasnijeg vizantijskog patrijarha.
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